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ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF CA~E 
While the Statement of the Case contained in appel-
lants Brief contains an abstract of a substantial part 
of the evidence received at the trial, much of the material 
evidence favorable to the respondent is omitted and 
considerable of the evidence which is abstracted is so 
recited as to give it a meaning more favorable to the 
appellant than the evidence, when considered as a whole, 
is entitled to. For the respondent to abstract the entire 
testimony would probably tend to confuse rather than 
clarify the matters at issue. We believe the court will be 
better able to evaluate the evidence and determine the 
issues which divide the parties if the respondent confines 
this, his additional statement of the case, to those mat-
ters which have been omitted from appellant's statement 
of the case and the evidence which respondent believes 
appellant has misconstrued. 
Appellant in his Brief under the heading Statement 
of Facts states its position, and as we understand it, 
contends: 
1. That the decision of the Trial Court should not 
be given the weight usually accorded to such court 
because of the long delay which lapsed between the 
time the case was tried and the time it reached its 
decision. 
2. That the evidence does not show that the plain-
tiff has established any right whatsoever to the waters 
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fron1 Duck Creek because it is not shown that water 
was applied to the lands for which a water right is 
claimed prior to 1903. 
3. That the respondent having been awarded the 
water "\Yhich finds its way into Duck Creek below what 
is referred to in the evidence as the Duck Creek Dam, 
he should not be awarded any water which is diverted 
at the Duck Creek Dam and diverted through the ditches 
leading therefrom to the lands which he is under con-
tract to purchase. 
-t That the appellant has not shown that he has any 
right to any water right divertable at the Duck Creek 
Dam or any right to divert any water through the ditches 
leading from such dam to his land. 
5. That the appellant has a right to a flow of be-
tween four and ten second feet of water through the 
ditches leading from each of the two dams that divert 
water from Duck Creek. 
6. That it is impracticable to carry out the terms 
of the Decree entered by the court below. 
In the course of our Additional Statement of the 
Case and argument, we shall attempt to direct the atten-
tion of the Court to the evidence which amply supports 
the Decree appealed from. 
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THE TRIAL COURT WAS SUPPLIED WITH A TRAN-
SCRIPT OF THE EVIDENCE AND IT VIEWED THE PREM-
ISES INVOLVED IN THE CONTROVERSY. 
Appellant directs the attention of the court to the 
fact that the trial court had this case under advisement 
for more than four years after the trial was had and 
before a decision was reached. Respondent certainly is 
not going to argue that such a long delay is justifiable, 
but the respondent having been deprived of the water 
to which he was entitled during those years, he should 
not also be penalized because of the delay. \Vhen the 
trial court, over objections of the respondent and appel-
lant, ordered that new parties be brought in, it became 
necessary to secure a transcript of the evidence received 
at the original trial as otherwise the new parties brought 
in were not advised of what the evidence consisted of 
and, of course, could not be bound thereby. The new 
parties who were brought in pursuant to the order of 
the court consented that the evidence received at the 
original trial might be received as to them if a transcript 
were furnished and they be given an opportunity to 
refute any of such evidence. Pursuant to such arrange-
ment, a transcript was prepared (See Tr. Vol. III, page 
830) and paid for by respondent and appellant and a 
copy thereof furnished to the court. Thus the trial court 
had available a complete record of the proceedings from 
which it could refresh its memory. 
Moreover, in cases such as this where the trial court 
views the premises in controversy, the rule that proper 
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weight should be g-i,Ten to the fact that the trial court 
has a better opportunity to arriYe at the truth than does 
the reviewing court is especially applicable. \Vhile the 
view of the premises is not in and of itself evidence, it 
serYe~ to enable the COlEt to understand and give proper 
weight to evidence as to any physical condition of the 
premises which are in dispute. To illustrate, there was 
some conflict in the evidence as to whether certain ditches 
on the property of the plaintiff were irrigation or drain 
ditches. If by a view of the premises it appeared that 
the ditches ·were on the high ridges running through the 
property of the plaintiff, such fact would be convincing 
proof that the same were for use in irrigation and not 
for drainage purposes. So also, if old ditches were so 
located that they would serve no useful purpose except 
as a means of irrigating plaintiff's land, such fact would 
add considerable weight and might well justify the trial 
court in making a finding that otherwise would not be 
justified by the cold record of the evidence. That the 
trial court viewed the premises is made to appear from 
the record. Tr. Vol. II, page 823. 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS WITHOUT CONFLICT THAT 
THE PREMISES OF THE PLAINTIFF WERE IRRIGATED 
WITH WATER DIVERTED FROM DUCK CREEK AT THE 
DUCK CREEK DAM AND COURSED THROUGH THE 
DITCHES LEADING TO HIS LAND LONG BEFORE 1903. 
In the Statement of the Case and elsewhere in the 
Brief, appellant makes the statement that the land of 
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the plaintiff was not irrigated until1906 and that there-
fore the plaintiff has completely failed to establish any 
right whatsoever to any of the water of Duck Creek. 
It may be worthy to note that the law of 1903 is not 
as exacting as counsel s~ems to contend. Section 72 of 
Chapter 100 of the Act of 1903 expressly provides that 
the repeal of the former law shall not effect any valid 
water right and that any water right initiated under 
the provisions of the law theretofore existing may be 
perfected in the same manner and with like effect as if 
such law had not been repealed. Prior to 1903, one 
could appropriate water by merely going upon a stream 
and diverting the water therefrom and putting it to a 
beneficial use. If, however, one desired to have a right 
when perfected relate back to a fixed time to prevent 
intervening claimants from acquiring a prior right, it 
was the practice to give notice of intention to appro--
priate a specified amount of water. However, the giving 
of such notice was not necessary to a valid appropria-
tion. An appropriation may be initiated by an intention 
to appropriate water for some useful purpose accom-
panied by some open physical demonstration of the 
intent. Elliot v. Whitmore, et al., 23 Utah 342; 65 Pac. 
70. Patterson v. Ryan, 37 Utah 410; 108 Pac. 1118. 
Deseret v. Hooplania, 66 Utah 251; 239 Pac. 479. Jensen 
v. Birch Creek Ranch, 76 Utah 356; 289 Pac. 1097. In 
this case, however, there is no necessity to resort to the 
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doctrine announced in the cases just cited to support the 
view that water was appropriated for the irrigation of 
a substantial part of plaintiff's land long before 1903. 
Ray Stevens, who owned the land or a substantial part 
of the land, upon which plaintiff claims a water right, from 
1906 to 19:24, testified that he has been familiar with 
the lands for the last forty or fifty years, Tr. 6. That 
other than what he referred to as the Korth Extension 
Ditch, he has been acquainted \vith the ditches ever since 
he was ten years old. Tr. 14. That he was 60 years old 
in 19±6 at the time he so testified. Tr. 15. That the 
ditches other than the north extension ditch were old 
ditches when he first became acquainted with them. Tr. 
14-15. That during the time the old ditches were in exist-
ence, he has known water to be coursed through them to 
the lands below. Tr. 15. It will be noted that the ditches 
referred to in the testimony just mentioned, are ditches 
leading from the Duck Creek Dam; that the ditches lead-
ing to the land of plaintiff were there in 1906, but some 
of them have been straightened out. Tr. 22. 
William Betts, a witness called by the plaintiff, testi-
fied that he was 72 years of age. That in March 1886 he 
worked for Orange Warner, who was then living on the 
A. J. Stewart ranch; that he worked for A. J. Stewart on 
his property from November 1, 1886 until November 
1887. That A. J. Stewart owned the property down there 
and was operating the same. Tr. 178. That water was 
diverted from the Benjamin Slough or Bear Creek at 
what has been referred to as the Duck Creek Dam, Tr. 
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179. That the dam was made with poles and slabs and 
1nanure and the water diverted in a northwest direction 
for a distance and then straight west; that the water was 
coursed west of the Jackson Stewart home and then 
used to irrigate some oats and potatoes; that it runs 
west eight acres (rods) or better. Tr. 180. (The Stew-
art home was at or near the northeast corner of Section 
31 and the northwest corner of Section 29. Tr. 358). 
That the ditch extended about eighty rods west of the 
Jackson Stewart barn and home. Tr. 181. 
A. J. Stewart was called as a witness by the defend-
ant and testified in part as follows : That he would be 
83 years of age in September. Tr. 356. That he has 
been acquainted with the Banjamin Slough since he 
was 11 years old. Tr. 356. That in about 1880 or 1885 
ditches were constructed to irrigate the land where 
there were meadows that had theretofore been flooded. 
Tr. 382. That A. J. Stewart, Sr. and A. J. Stewart, Jr. 
owned and operated their lands in common until after 
1885; that they irrigated about 40 acres of land; that 
of the land irrigated, 10 acres was west of the highway. 
Tr. 37 4. That he had seen some of the ditches on the 
property in controversy just before the trial and they 
were at the same location as they were when he first 
went down in that territory. Tr. 158. That water to 
irrigate the land shown on the map, plaintiff's Exhibit 
A, was secured by commingling the water from the springs 
north of Payson and the water diverted out of Duck 
Creek at the Duck Creek Dam. Tr. 474-488-490. That 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
there was about 100 or 75 acres irrigated with water 
frmn those sources. (It will be noted that the land indi-
cated by the blue and black on plaintiff's Exhibit A is a 
part of the land being purchased by the plaintiff for 
which he claims a water right.) 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE WATER 
WHICH COMES FROM THE SPRINGS NORTH OF PAYSON 
IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR THE IRRIGATION OF THE 
EASTERLY PART OF PLAINTIFF'S LAND AND THERE-
FORE, IF RESPONDENT IS DEPRIVED FROM SECURING 
WATER DIVERTED AT THE DUCK CREEK DAM, THE 
EASTERLY PART OF HIS PROPERTY WILL BE REN-
DERED VALUELESS. 
It is asserted in appellant's Statement of Facts and 
repeated in its argument that the water from the springs 
arising to the north of Payson which finds its way into 
Duck Creek between the Duck Creek Dam and the Ste-
vens Dam is sufficient to supply respondent's needs. It 
is also repeatedly asserted that the water available 
from the springs north of Payson flows about two second 
feet. 
Ray Stevens, one of plaintiff's witnesses, did esti-
mate that about one and a half or two second feet of 
water finds its way into Duck Creek from spr.ings arising 
north of Payson City. Tr. 87. However, actual measure-
ments made by Elmer Jacob, a witness called by the 
defendant, show that on June 16, 1946, there was 1.13 
cubic feet per second available at the Stevens Dam. Tr. 
422. That was the total quantity of water that accumu-
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lated in Duck Creek below the Duck Creek Dam and 
above the Ntevens Dam. That rneasurement was made 
within a few days after there had been a heavy rain-
storm so that the water at the Stevens Dam was in all 
probability above the normal amount. It is made to 
appear that on the preceding June 4th, there was an esti-
mated ten second feet of water passing the Stevens Dam 
and that the flow had recently been much more, Tr. 297-
298. No claim is or could successfully be made by the 
defendant con1pany that it ever had any interest in or 
claim to the water \vhich finds its way into Duck Creek 
below the Duck Creek Dam. That water cannot be de-
livered by gravity flow to the stockholders of the defend-
ant company because the lands of the stockholders of the 
defendant company are higher in elevation than the 
water in Duck Creek below the Duck Creek Dam. More-
over, at the trial, counsel for the defendant company 
stated that the company made no claim to such water. 
Tr. 19. 
Moreover, by the Decree appealed from, the parties 
are limited to four acre feet per annum on the lands 
involved in this controversy. If the water which finds 
its way into Duck Creek below the Duck Creek dam 
exceeds four acre feet for the land irrigated from that 
water, the plaintiff is not awarded any water above that 
amount. At this point we digress to observe that we find 
it extremely difficult to follow the argument of appellant 
that it should be awarded a flow of four cubic feet per 
second to supply the land of the stockholders of the 
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defendant cmnpany who divert water fro1n the upper 
dam to irrigate the about 100 acres of land irrigated 
frmn that source. and at the san1e tin1e contend that less 
than one-third of that mnount, that is 1.13 second feet, 
is ample to irrigate an equal amount of land which is 
being irrigated by plaintiff with water diverted at the 
Stevens Dmn. "\Ye shall presently have more to say 
about this unusual contention in connection with the 
evidence touching the amount of water awarded to the 
defendant company. 
~\t this point, suffice it to say, the trial court awarded 
to the plaintiff only such water as defendant's witness, 
Elmer Jacob, testified was necessary to supply such land 
with a proper quantity of water. :Mr. Jacob testified in 
part as follows: After having qualified to testify as an 
expert he stated: "Well, I think a reasonable duty there 
would be seventy acres to the second foot delivered at the 
land based upon the flow of water; that is the amount 
allowed by the State Engineer in his certificate * * *." 
"Well, I think seventy would be a reasonable duty, 
seventy acres to the second foot. It is a heavy clay 
ground and the surface would not be heavy and the land 
will hold water very well." Tr. 433. On cross examina-
tion, he stuck to his opinion that the duty of water on 
the land here involved is a second foot to seventy acres. 
On cross-examination he was asked the following 
questions and gave the following answers : 
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"Q. If the water is only available for a part of 
the year, would you need more than or less 
than one second foot to seventy acres of land 
where you only had water a part of the time. 
"A. It wouldn't make any difference, if you have 
an excess of water and we have a drouth 
later on, I am trying to answer your question 
as I understand it,-and with your drouth 
after the first of July, if you pour water 
into prior to that time, the only thing that 
you can follow up is your ground water and 
when that is gone, the drouth will destroy 
the crops later on. Now the water that was 
available earlier than July first, that is water 
under the bridge. If you don't get it after 
July first, your crop will die. It wouldn't 
matter if you had a duty as lot (large) as 
ten acres to the second foot, if you don't get 
any after that, you can't raise a late crop." 
Tr. 437-438. 
Mr. Jacob upon being recalled testified that the 
land here involved could get along with about four acre 
feet per acre per annum. Tr. 642. It will be noted that if 
we take Mr. Jacob's measurement of the flow of Duck 
Creek below the Duck Creek Dam at 1.13 second feet and 
the area irrigated from the Stevens Dam at 100 acres, 
there would be less than one second foot of water avail-
able for 70 acres of land. It would seem that no useful 
purpose will be served by further argument on this phase 
of the case because the defendant may not be heard to 
complain about the award of the water arising in Duck 
Creek below the Duck Creek Dam because such water 
is not available to it and in effect it has disclaimed any 
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right to such water. There see1ns to be no issue of fad 
or of law with respert to that water. Even if there 
should be sufficient or n1ore than sufficient water finding 
its way into Duck Creek below the Duck Creek Dam, 
such fact could not affect plaintiff's right to divert water 
from the Duck Creek Dam to irrigate land which must 
be irrigated with water diverted at the Duck Creek Dam. 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT IN EXCESS OF 68 
ACRES OF PLAINTIFF'S LAND WAS, AT THE TIME AND 
Tll\IES INVOLVED IN THIS CONTROVERSY, IRRIGATED 
FROM WATER DIVERTED FROM DUCK CREEK AT THE 
DUCK CREEK DAM. 
It is asserted in appellant's Statement of Facts that 
the evidence shows that only thirty acres of grain has 
been irrigated by the predecessors in interest of the 
plaintiff with water diverted from Duck Creek at the 
Duck Creek Dam. Of course, no one claims that there 
was sufficient water available at all times, or for that 
matter at any time, during the summer season to irri-
gate all of the land that had at times been devoted to 
raising cultivated crops. There was not sufficient water 
for the land which was irrigated from the upper dam 
and which was, at the time of the incorporation of the 
defendant company, awarded two shares of water to each 
acre of land. See testimony of Mrs. Hickman. Tr. Vol. 
I, page 390-392. There is much other evidence to the 
same effect and it is so alleged in the pleadings of the 
parties and in the trial court's findings. R. 193, Finding 
26. 
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If, as the evidence shows, there was not sufficient 
water to irrigate the land under the upper dam with 
two share1-> to the acre, it follows that less than one-half 
of the land which the court found had been devoted 
to the raising of cultivated crops with water diverted 
from the lower or Duck Creek dam could be irrigated 
in any season with one share of water allotted to it pur-
suant to the Articles of Incorporation of the defendant 
company. In other words, of the approximately 200 
shares of water right in defendant company which was 
allotted to irrigate the approximately 100 acres of land 
irrigated from the water diverted from the upper dam, 
it follows that less than one-half of the 200 acres of 
land owned by the stockholders of the defendant company 
which the court found had been devoted to raising culti-
vated crops could have been irrigated in any given year 
with the slightly in excess of 200 shares that were, by the 
Articles of Incorporation of the defendant company, 
allotted to landowners who irrigated their land from 
water diverted at the lower or Duck Creek Dam. 
We have heretofore indicated in this Brief that the 
defendant company cannot well be concerned with the 
water which finds its way into Duck Creek below the 
Duck Creek Dam and above the Stevens Dam. If, as 
defendant company contends, there is an average flow 
of two second feet available below the Duck Creek Dam 
for irrigation, the plaintiff under the Decree would have 
used all of the water to which he is entitled by the use 
of that water. Thus, Mr. Jacob, the defendant com-
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pany's expert witness, testified and the court found that 
four aere feet per acre is the duty of water on the land 
here involYed and that the irrigation season extends 
for a period of probably six months or about 184 days. 
Two second foot of water will flow approximately 736 
acres of water in an irrigation season of six months 
which it will be noted is more water than was awarded 
to the plaintiff to irrigate the land which is irrigated 
from the Stevens Dam. R. 205. In any event, such water 
is not available to the defendant company, and as we 
have pointed out, the defendant company at the trial in 
effect disclaimed all right to such water. 
The controversy thus resolves itself to the amount 
of land that the plaintiff should be awarded a water 
right to irrigate with water diverted out of Duck Creek 
at the Duck Creek Dam. The total area covered by the 
contract to purchase by the plaintiff consists of 387.75 
acres. See plaintiff's Exhibit D 2. 
Touching the amount of land irrigated by plaintiff's 
predecessor in interest, Edward Ray Stevens, out of 
water diverted at the Duck Creek Dam, he testified that 
one hundred acres was irrigated from the Stevens Dam. 
Tr. 21. That about one-half of the 47¥2 acre piece marked 
in green on the map was irrigated out of the Stewart 
Ditch which diverts water from the Duck Creek Dam; 
that he has watered that land every year since 1906; 
that all of the ditches on the lands in controversy were 
there in 1906, but some have been straightened out. 
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Tr. 22. That he has irrigated one-half of the 47¥2 acres 
shown on the map, plaintiff's Exhibit A, from water 
diverted from Duck Creek Dam ever since he acquired 
the property in 1906. That he has irrigated through 
the north ditch ever since he owned the property; that 
the two ditches were used to irrigate about 100 acres. 
Tr. 24; that about 175 acres of the portion marked in 
red has been irrigated out of the ditches leading from 
the Duck Creek Dam. Tr. 26. That out of the ditch 
that is used to irrigate one-half of the 47¥2 acres, is 
also used to irrigate about 40 acres marked in red. That 
is irrigated out of the ditch marked Old Stewart Ditch, 
but there is probably not quite 40 acres; that he irri-
gated about 20 acres out of the other Stewart Ditch. Tr. 
28. After a Mr. Wilson testified, Mr. Stevens was re-
called and in order to clear up his testimony, he further 
testified : That he irrigated out of the South Stewart 
Ditch 23 to 25 acres. Tr. 50. That he irrigates an addi-
tional 10 acres out of that ditch, and about one-half to 
two-thirds of another piece of about 50 acres or about 
30 or 35 acres. Tr. 52. That he irrigated about 30 acres 
out of the second ditch. Tr. 54. That he irrigated approx-
imately 80 acres out of the most northerly ditch. Tr. 
54. Mr. Stevens further testified that during the time 
he owned the lands in controversy, he raised wheat, 
barley, oats and meadow hay. Tr. 63. That he usually 
planted thirty to forty acres in grain; that two years 
he had 80 acres in grain that were irrigated out of water 
diverted from the Duck Creek Dam. Tr. 64. That he 
irrigated meadow hay out of water diverted from Duck 
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Creek Dam. Tr. 65. That he irrigated about 80 acres 
of grain fr01n the Stevens Dam. That at one time he had 
70 acres of alfalfa that was irrigated out of the Stevens 
Dam. Tr. 72. That since the Benjamin drain was put 
in you can't raise grain without water. Tr. 67. Mr. 
Stevens further testified that he raised 150 to 200 tons 
of hay in the dry year of 1934. That when the water 
got down to two second feet, he did not attempt to use 
any water. Tr. 90. That after the drain was constructed, 
he got some of that water. Tr. 91. 
During the direct examination of Edward R. Stevens 
an attempt was made to show that when the Duck Creek 
Irrigation Company was formed he was asked to join 
that company, but such evidence was rejected because 
Andrew Stewart who asked him to join was dead. Tr. 
141. However, later on cross-examination the informa-
tion was brought out. Tr. 156. Mr. Stevens further 
testified that no one questioned his right to the use of 
water diverted from the Duck Creek Dam until about 
1942 or 1943. Tr. 58-59. 
Howard Stevens, a son of Edward R. Stevens, who 
was the owner of part of the property for which the 
plaintiff had a contract of purchase and for which a 
water right was claimed, Tr. 206, testified in part as 
follows : That on numerous occasions he helped the 
Tucker boys, Ren Stewart, and Lavar Curtis clean out 
the ditch referred to in the evidence as the Stewart 
Ditch. That he also helped clean out the ditch marked 
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Stewart Ditch No. 2. Tr. 207-208. That he did work 
on the ditches every spring; that he was 34 years old 
at the time of the trial, Tr. 205, and he remembered 
those ditches as far back as he could remember; that is 
since he was six or eight years old. Tr. 209. That water 
was diverted through the ditches that he has mentioned 
during each and every year as far back as he can remem-
ber and that so far as he knew no one ever questioned 
the right of the witness and his father to use the ditches 
and the water that was used; that the water used 
through those ditches came from the Duck Creek Dam. 
Tr. 210. That there was 83 or 84 acres in one tract, about 
50 acres in another tract and about 10 or 11 acres 
in another tract irrigated with water diverted at the 
Stevens Dam. Tr. 211. That about 23 or 24 acres of 
·the land marked in green, and about ten acres of the 
land of the south part of that painted red, and ten acres 
of meadow was irrigated from the South ditch that 
diverts water from Duck Greek. That the lands that 
are irrigated with water diverted at the Duck Creek 
Dam cannot be irrigated with water diverted at the 
Stevens Dam. Tr. 212; that about 35 acres of land was 
irrigated from the next ditch to the north, that is the 
ditch marked Stewart Ditch No.2 on the map, plaintiff's 
Exhibit A. Tr. 213. That about 90 acres was irrigated 
with water diverted through the most northerly ditch 
diverting water from the Duck Creek Dam. Tr. 214. 
That meadow hay, wheat, barley, oats and in later years 
alfalfa was raised on the land, and from 125 to 200 head 
of cattle were fed on the property. Tr. 217. 
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THE EYIDENCE SHO\VS THAT PLAINTIFF'S PREDE-
CESSORS HAVE USED THE DITCHES LEADING FROM 
THE DUCK CREEK DAl\I, UNDER CLAIMS OF RIGHT, 
TO CO~YEY "TATER TO PLAINTIFF'S LANDS FOR MORE 
THA~ A HALF CENTURY AND THAT PLAINTIFF'S PRE-
DECESSOR, A. H. RALEIGH, 'VAS ON DECEMBER 23, 1896 
AWARDED SCCH RIGHT, TOGETHER WITH A RIGHT TO 
SO:'IIE OF THE WATERS OF DUCK CREEK OR BENJAMIN 
SLOUGH. 
There was received in evidence the files in the case 
of A. H. Ra~eigl1 v . .A. J. Steu·art, Jr. et al., Case No. 
56. Tr. 817. It will be seen from the Decree entered 
in that case that A. H. Raleigh was awarded all of the 
waters of certain designated springs up to July first. 
It further appears from the findings that "the plaintiff 
and defendants are each entitled to some water from 
\Yhat is known and described in the pleadings as The 
Slough or Slough Springs, but is not able to find from 
the testimony submitted the amount each or any of the 
parties are entitled to." It will further be noted that 
the 100 acres of land upon which such water was to be 
used for irrigation consists of the southeasterly part of 
the land to which plaintiff claims a water right. 
An examination of plaintiff's Exhibit A and defend-
ants' Exhibit 2 shows the location of the ditches leading 
from the Duck Creek Dam at the time of the trial. It 
will be seen from both of the maps that all of the branches 
of the ditch that lead from the lower dam extend to the 
lands of the plaintiff. In light of the fact that the ter-
ritory involved in this controversy slopes towards the 
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northwest, it is very significant that these ditches are 
all constructed to the lands of the plaintiff. Of course 
if these ditches were of recent construction there might 
be some merit to defendants' contention that plaintiff 
has not established a right to the use of the same, but 
~ueh is not this record. Mr. Edward R. Stevens testified 
that the ditches have been where they were at the time 
of the trial as long as he can remember or since he was 
ten years old, except for some slight changes. (He was 
60 years old at the time of the trial and he purchased 
part of the property now being purchased by the plaintiff 
in 1906). The ditches were old ditches when he first 
becan1e acquainted with them. That Andrew Stewart 
Sr. was the principal owner of the land over which 
the ditches ran when he first became acquainted with 
that territory. Tr. 14. 
\V e have heretofore directed the attention of the 
court to the testimony of William Betts in which he 
testified that a ditch extended westward to the lands of 
plaintiff as early as 1886. Tr. 180. Howard Stevens 
testified that he helped clean out the ditches about every 
year; that no one ever questioned the ~ight of he and 
his father to use the ditches so far as he knew. Tr. 210. 
Edward R. Stevens testified that he did not help 
out in the cement dam which is referred to in the evi-
dence as the Duck Creek Dam, but he did help fix it up. 
Tr. 11. That no one questioned his right to use the 
ditches until 1940. Tr. 63. That he helped put in some 
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concrete head gates in the ditches leading frmn the 
Duck Creek Dan1. and a wooden eulYert, and a wooden 
head gate. Tr. 111. That about 1922 he and Ren Stew-
art put in a culvert and a wooden headgate a little ·west 
of th2 Duck Creek Dam; that a little west and north 
of the Duck Creek Dmn, he helped put in three cement 
dan1s. Tr. 1:28. That he furnished some of the flash 
boards for the Duck Creek Dam which at times he 
removed to let the water down to the Stevens Dmn; 
that on several occasions he worked on the ditches, 
Tr. 1:3:2. That he and Ren Stewart worked on the ditch 
that runs north; that they were using a ditcher and the 
team ran away and Ren Stewart was injured. Tr. 133. 
In the course of our argument, we may find occa-
sion to refer to other evidenc~, but the foregoing state-
ment ·will serve to direct the attention of the court to 
plaintiff's theory of what the facts are, as disclosed by 
the evidence. 
BY THE DECREE APPEALED FROM THE DEFEND-
ANT, DUCK CREEK IRRIGATION COMPANY, WAS 
AWARDED MORE THAN A SUFFICIENT PRIMARY 
WATER RIGHT TO SUPPLY THE LANDS OF ITS STOCK-
HOLDERS UNDER THE UPPER DAM. 
Throughout its Brief the appellant contends that 
the water users under the Upper Dam have a water 
right to irrigate their lands which is superior to any 
right of the plaintiff and that during the trial plaintiff 
conceded that to be so. We again concede that to be so. 
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However, the Court in its decree awarded to the defend-
ant a prior right to two second feet which is more than 
sufficient to satisfy the prior rights of the stockholders 
who divert their water from the Upper Dam. We again 
direct the attention of the Court to the testimony of 
defendants' witness, Elmer A. Jacob. He testified that 
the duty of water on the lands here involved was one 
second foot to 70 acres of land. Tr. 433. Counsel for 
the plaintiff on cross-examination attempted to get ~fr. 
Jacob to admit that it would require more than one 
second foot of water for 70 acres if there was not a 
constant stream. However, Mr. Jacob insisted that more 
than a second foot to 70 acres of land could not be bene-
ficially used on the land of the parties to this litigation. 
Tr. 437. 
The evidence further shows that about 100 acres 
and not to exceed 150 acres of land is and has been irri-
gated with water diverted from the Upper Dam. See 
testimony of o~ R. Stewart. Tr. 627. The fact that about 
150 acres of land was irrigated out of the Upper Dam 
is further supported by the fact that about 200 shares 
of stock in the Duck Creek Irrigation Company was 
issued to the water use-rs under the Upper Dam and 
two shares were issued to each acre of land that was 
being irrigated. Tr. 397 and 628. 
In addition to the court awarding the defendant 
a prior right to 2 cubic feet per second, the Decree 
awards the defendant company and its stockholders 
400 j568 of the flow of Duck Creek so long as the total 
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the "\Yater users who divert water from the Upper Dmn 
are pennitted to participate in additional water that 
may be available for use even though the defendant 
con1pany and its stockholders are fully supplied with 
a flow of two second feet. 
The court having awarded to the defendant company 
and its stockholders who divert water from the upper 
dam all and more water than the evidence of their expert 
witness, Jacob, testified was sufficient, the appellant 
has no cause to complain. 
It is argued in appellant's brief that the water 
which finds its way into Duck Creek below the Duck 
Creek Dam is sufficient to supply the needs of the 100 
acres of land that the court found is and has been irri-
gated with water diverted from the Stevens Dam. The 
evidence shows that when Jacob made this measure-
ment on June 16 there was only 1.13 second feet of 
water available at the Stevens Dam. If 1.13 second feet 
of water is sufficient to supply plaintiff's land which 
is irrigated from the Stevens Dam, surely the two second 
feet of primary right awarded to the defendant is much 
more than sufficient to irrigate the approximately 100 
acres of land that is irrigated with water diverted from 
the Upper Dam. In one breath it is argued that the 1.13 
cubic feet of water is sufficient to irrigate 100 acres of 
plaintiff's land and in the next breath it is argued that 
about four times that quantity of water is necessary to 
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irrigate an equal amount of the land of the stockholders 
of the defendant company and such claim is made not-
withstanding the lands join. 
It is somewhat difficult to follow the argument of 
counsel for the defendant company touching the water 
that finds its way into Duck Creek below the Duck Creek 
Dmn. As we understood defendants' position at the trial 
they did not claim and never had claimed any right to 
the water that finds its way into Duck Creek below Duck 
Creek Dam. It was so stated by counsel for the defend-
ant at the trial. Tr. 19. There is thus no issue as to the 
water which finds its way into Duck Creek below the 
Duck Creek Dam. So also there is no issue as to the 
priority of the water beneficially used by the stockhold-
ers who divert water from the upper dam. More than 
the quantity of water to which such stockholders are 
entitled has, as heretofore pointed o~t, been awarded 
to the defendant company. 
In our view, this controversy in so far as it effects 
defendants' appeal resolves itself into the following: 
1. After the defendant has been supplied with a 
flow of two second feet of water does the evidence sup-
port an award to the plaintiff of a right to 168/568 of 
the flow of the Benjamin Slough during the period ex-
tending from March 1st to December 1st of each year and 
to 68/368 of such water from May 1st to August 15th of 
each year so long as the water does not exceed twenty-
eight cubic feet per second. 
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•) Does the plaintiff haYe a right to use the ditches 
which divert water frmn the Duck Creek to his lands to 
carry the water to his land. 
If the plaintiff has the right to the use of the water 
above indicated, we do not anticipate it will be contended 
that if he chooses he n1ay pern1it the water which may 
be diverted at the Duck Creek Dam to flow past that 
dam and be diverted at the Stevens Dam. Obviously 
the defendant company and its stockholders cannot be 
injured by such procedure, and if and when . the flow 
of water into Duck Creek below the Duck Greek Dam 
falls to as low as about one second foot, such a small 
quanti(y of water would be of little or no value in use 
for irrigation. 
We have heretofore,in this brief, directed the, atten-
tion of the court to plaintiff's evidence touching the use 
of water which his predecessors diverted from the Duck 
Creek Dam and the work he did towards maintaining 
that dam and the ditches leading therefrom. We shall 
not repeat such testimony. Counsel for the defendant 
company has directed the attention of the court to cer-
tain testimony of the witness, Edward R. Stevens. 
The evidence supports the finding of the trial court 
to the effect that during low water seasons the water 
available from Duck Creek was devoted to raising culti-
vated crops. No complaint is made of such finding. Ap-
parently counsel for defendant company would have 
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the court believe that the stockholders of the defendant 
company irrigated 300 acres of land devoted to the rais-
ing of cultivated crops each year. Such a contention is 
wholly without support in the evidence. On the contrary, 
the evidence is all to the effect that even the land that was 
irrigated with water diverted from the Upper Dam and 
which had two shares of water for one acre of land was 
always short of water during the low water season. 
See testimony of Mrs. Hickman, Tr. 390, testimony of 
George W. Tucker, Tr. 549 and testimony of 0. R. Stew-
art, Tr. 672. 
Counsel for the defendant company is in error when 
he says that Edward R. Stevens never raised more than 
30 acres of cultivated crops. On page 64 of the tran-
script, Mr. Edward R. Stevens testified that he usually 
plants 10 acres into oats, and as a rule about thirty or 
forty acres into grain, and he put about 80 acres into 
grain two years. It is, to say the least, doubtful if under 
the evidence in this case a finding to the effect that the 
stockholders of the defendant company who diverted 
water from the Duck Creek Dam irrigated as much as 
100 acres of cultivated crops in any given year with 
water so diverted, yet it will be noted that the defendant 
company was awarded a water right during the period 
extending from May 1st to August 15th on the basis of 
the stockholders of the defendant company who divert 
water at the Duck Creek Dam devoting 200 acres to the 
raising of cultivated crops. The award was on a total 
area of 300 acres being devoted to cultivated crops and 
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of that acreage 100 acres were irrigated with water 
diverted at the Upper Darn. \Ve again direct the atten-
tion of the court to the fact that in addition to the pro-
portion of the water awarded to the defendant company, 
it was also awarded two second feet whenever the water 
fell to or below that amount. 
In connection "ith the distinction n1ade by the trial 
court in its award of water for cultivated and non-cul-
tivated crops, we digress to observe that so far as we are 
advised the use of water to produce hay and grasses 
to feed 125 to 200 head of cattle is as much a beneficial 
use as it is to use water to produce other crops. Indeed 
with the present price of beef it would be fortunate if 
more lands were devoted to the raising of livestock. 
If, however, the defendant company should have its way 
and make the owner of plaintiff's property dependent 
upon the consent of defendant to the use of the waters 
of Duck Creek and the ditches leading from Duck Creek, 
which plaintiff's predecessors have used for more than 
half a century, then and in such case plaintiff's lands 
would be rendered valueless. If the actions of the officers 
of the defendant company denying to plaintiff his right 
to course water to his lands is any criterion as to what 
to expect in the future, the officers of the defendant com-
pany are bent on compelling the plaintiff, and those 
who might acquire the property which he is purchasing, 
to rely solely on their will as to whether plaintiff and his 
successors may or may not continue in the business of 
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raising cattle on the property being purchased by the 
plaintiff. In this semi-arid west, hay and grasses will 
not grow without water. 
It appears from the evidence that Stevens has raised 
as much as 200 tons of hay in one season in addition 
to grain on property which plaintiff is purchasing and 
has maintained from 125 to 200 head of cattle thereon. 
It is repeatedly stated in appellants' brief that 
plaintiff's predecessor in interest sought and secured 
the consent of the defendant to use the ditches and water 
which was used. Counsel for appellant is in error in 
making such statement. So far as the evidence shows 
neither the plaintiff nor his predecessors in interest 
ever sought or secured the consent of the defendant 
company to use either the ditches or the water which 
was used. Plaintiff did, just prior to the commencement 
of this action, demand from the defendant company 
that it permit him to use some water and the ditches, 
which demand was refused except on condition that he 
make a token payment to the defendant company for use 
of the ditches and that the defendant company had water 
that it would sell to the plaintiff. Tr. 324 to 326. There 
is evidence that on one or two occasions Mr. Stevens 
asked the one who was using the water for the same. 
Such fact may tend to show that Mr. Stevens was behav-
ing like a good neighbor should by not taking the water 
until his neighbor had finished irrigating his land, but 
surely Mr. Stevens was not required to engage in any 
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encotmter with his neighbor in order to maintain his 
water right. In this connection, it should also be ob-
served that so far as the evidence shows, neither the 
defendant nor its stockholders took the water away from 
plaintiffs predecessors when they were in the process of 
irrigating their crops. 
:Jioreover, it is an elementary principle of law in 
this jurisdiction that one cannot acquire a right to the 
public waters of this state by the mere use thereof. 
The use must be beneficial. U.C.A. 1943, 100-1-3 and 
cases cited in the foot note. It would be enlightening 
to learn how the defendant company acquired a right 
to the waters of Duck Creek so that it had water to sell 
to the plaintiff. So also would it be enlightening to be 
informed as to why it was necessary for the plaintiff 
to secure the consent of the defendant company to use 
the \Vater of Duck Creek that was not being used or 
could not be beneficially used by the defendant or its 
stockholders. 
It is also repeatedly asserted that the predecessors 
of the plaintiff did not assert a right to the use of water 
during low water seasons. Edward R. Stevens did so 
testify. During the late season there was rarely sufficient 
water available to be of any use to irrigate plaintiff's 
land. It would have been an idle gesture for the owner 
of the property being purchased by the plaintiff to have 
demanded water when the water available could not 
have reached such property in sufficient quantity to be 
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of any benefit. If defendants' witnesses are to be believed 
that was the condition that prevailed every year after the 
middle of June or the first of July. Tr. 377-406-672. 
Indeed on June 16 during the trial when Elmer 
Jacob made his investigation of the flow of Duck Creek, 
which was within a few days after a heavy rain, there 
was only 1.93 second feet being diverted at the Upper 
Dam. Tr. 439. On that day there was 2.01 diverted at 
the lower dam and the total flow of Duck Creek on that 
day was 2.77 second feet. Tr. 440. It will be remembered 
that the defendant company is by the decree awarded 
a prior right to two second feet. 
There is no way of determining just what the vari-
ous witnesses meant when they referred to low water, 
but as we have heretofore pointed out, the evidence 
shows that when the flow of Duck Creek got so low that it 
was of little or no value to those who diverted water 
from the Lower Duck Creek Dam and particularly to 
those at the end of the ditches leading from that dam, 
the upper land owners used the water because they 
were the only ones who could get it onto their lands to 
do any good. 
The evidence also shows that prior to about :May 1st 
to May 15th, depending on the season, there is no demand 
for water to irrigate agricultural crops. Tr. 589. The 
trial court in its findings took the earlier date of ~fay 1st 
when irrigation begins. 
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It is a n1atter of cmnn1on knowledge that in operat-
ing a farm, the crops planted thereon vary from year 
to year, and as different crops are planted the time that 
water can be applied Yaries. Thus as the evidence shows, 
grasses and wild hay and probably alfalfa can be bene-
ficially irrigated as early as ~larch or April. If per-
chance land devoted to the raising of gra1n should be 
devoted to a pasture for dairy cows, it would be little 
short of a calanrity if \Yater could not be used to irri-
gate such land until ~Iay 1st or 15th because it had there-
tofore been used for raising grain which had not been 
irrigated before ~Iay. If a tract of land has a water 
right, cmmnon sense dictates that water should be applied 
when the crop growing thereon needs irrigation. 
THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SHOW THAT DEFEND-
ANT COMPANY IS ENTITLED TO ANY MORE WATER 
THAN WAS AWARDED TO IT. 
Under its second point, defendant asserts that it 
should be awarded a flow of at least eight second feet 
of water at and above the Duck Creek Dam during 
low water and twelve second feet as a first and primary 
right. Obviously in making such a claim, the testimony 
of defendant witnesses, including their expert Elmer 
A. Jacob, is to be ignored. The trial court in its find-
ings has gone the limit in determining the amount of 
land that has been and at the trial was being irrigated 
by the stockholders of defendant company with the 
waters from Duck Creek. We have heretofore directed 
the attention of the court to the testimony of their prin-
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cipal witness, Ren f-;tewart, where he stated that when 
the Duck Creek Irrigation Company was formed two 
shares of stock were awarded to each acre of land that 
was being irrigated from the upper dam and one share of 
stock to each acre of land that was being irrigated from 
the lower dam. It will be seen from the Articles of Incor-
poration that 437 shares were issued by the Duck Creek 
Irrigation Company. (See plaintiff's Exhibit B). If, as 
the evidence shows, one-half of such shares went to the 
land owners who diverted water from the Upper Dam and 
2 shares were issued to each acre of land so irrigated, 
there would be 1091;4 acres of land irrigated from the 
upper dam and 218lf2 acres irrigated with water from 
the lower dam, or a total of 3273;4 acres of land irrigated 
by the stockholders of defendant company with water 
from the two dams. Notwithstanding such evidence, the 
trial court found that the stockholders of the defendant 
company were and had been irrigating 300 acres of land 
devoted to the raising of agricultural crops and 100 acres 
of land devoted to the irrigation of other lands. The 
only possible justification for the finding that the stock-
holders of the defendant company were and had been 
irrigating a total of 400 acres was the testimony of 
Ren Stewart, defendants' principal witness and one of 
its stockholders, that there was about 3 times as much 
land irrigated with water diverted at the Duck Creek 
Dam as that irrigated with water diverted at the Upper 
Dam. 
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Thus, if effect is giYen to the testilnony of defend-
ants' expert witness, Jacob, the most that defendant 
could clain1 for the 300 acres of land devoted to culti-
vated crops would be ±.03 second feet. It will be noted 
that under the decree appealed from, the defendant is 
a\Yarded more than that amount of water and the plain-
tiff is awarded only water to irrigate 68 acres while the 
defendant is awarded water to irrigate 300 acres of 
cultivated crops. R. 204. Thus the defendant was award-
ed a water right to all, if indeed not more land than its 
stockholders claim to have irrigated, while the plaintiff 
was awarded a water right to only a part of the land 
that his witnesses testified had been and was being irri-
gated. 'Ve shall again revert to this phase of the case 
when we come to a discussion of plaintiff's cross assign-
ments of error. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT ONLY JUSTIFIED, BUT 
EQUITY REQUIRED IT TO PROVIDE FOR A ROTATION 
OF TURNS IN THE USE OF WATER. 
It will be noted that by the Decree entered in this 
case, the plaintiff was awarded 168/568 and the defend-
ant 400/568 of the waters of Duck Creek up to 28 second 
feet and during the season from May 1st to December 1st 
plaintiff was awarded 68/368 and the defendant 300/368 
of such waters. Obviously, it would be an utter impos-
sibility to divide the water in that proportion and even 
if it were the results would be a waste of the water. 
If there were at a given time, say four second feet of 
water at the Duck Creek Dam and plaintiff should be 
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permitted to take 68j368 or less than 1/5 of the flow, 
such an award would be a farce. It would require the 
constant attention of an engineer to make the division, 
and when the division was made the water to which the 
plaintiff would be entitled would be wholly valueless 
for use of the plaintiff. That our courts may make pro-
vision for rotation of water rights finds support in the 
following cases: Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company 
v. Shurtliff et al., 49 Utah 569, 164 Pac. 856; Fienster-
maker v. Jorgensen, 53 Utah 325, 178 Pac. 760; Dameron 
Valley Reservoir & Canal Company v. Bleak, 61 Utah 
230, 211 Pac. 97 4. Indeed the defendant company claims 
that it has followed that procedure. 
PLAINTIFF HAS ACQUIRED A RIGHT THROUGH HIS 
PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST TO THE USE OF THE 
DITCHES LEADING FROM THE DUCK CREEK DAM TO 
HIS LANDS. 
If, as we have heretofore pointed out, the plaintiff 
has a right to the use of water diverted at the Duck 
Creek Dam to irrigate the lands that cannot be irrigated 
with water diverted at the Stevens Dam, it follows 
that he has a right to the use of the means of conveying 
such water to his land. 
Counsel for the defendant apparently proceeds on 
the theory that the Duck Creek Irrigation Company 
not only owns all of the water that finds its way into 
Duck Creek, but also owns the ditches which are used 
to convey the water to the land which throughout the 
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year has been irrigated with such water. It is contended 
that the Duck Creek Irrigation Con1pany secured its 
right to the use of the ditches by reason of the Articles 
of Incorporation of the Duck Creek Irrigation Cmnpany. 
If that be its source of title, it has no title to the ditches 
for some distance after the water is diverted from Duck 
Creek at the Duck Creek Dam. That land was owned 
by Eliza Stewart when the Articles of Incorporation 
were signed and she was not one of the incorporators. 
Tr. 65-!. 
~Ioreover, A. H. Raleigh, plaintiff's predecessor 
in title, was awarded a right to course water to irrigate 
the lands being purchased by the plaintiff across lands 
which \vere then owned by Andrew J. Stewart, Jr. and 
across which the ditches now being used to carry water 
to the plaintiff's land are located. We again direct 
the attention of the court to the Findings, Conclusions 
and Decree made and entered in 1896 in the case of A. H. 
Raleigh v. A. J. Stewart, Jr. et al. The land across which 
the right was granted was secured by Andrew J. Stew-
art, Jr. from the United States of America (see tenth 
page of the instruments certified to by F. M. Alder, 
Court Reporter). Counsel is in error when he says 
that the only water involved in that litigation was water 
that came from the springs north of Payson. In its 
findings the Court stated "that plaintiff and defendant 
are each entitled to some water from what is known and 
described in the pleadings as The Slough or Slough 
Springs, but is not able to find from the testimony sub-
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mitted the amount of water each or any of the parties 
are entitled to." Moreover, one who has a right to course 
water across anothers land is not deprived of such right 
because perchance, the one who has such right may get 
his water from a different source. 
Plaintiff however, need not rely on the award made 
1n 1896. Having used the ditches since at least 1906, 
plaintiff has an easement by perscription. In Utah and 
generally, a perscriptive right is acquired by use for a 
period of 20 years. North Point Consolidated Irrigation 
Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 16 Utah 246, 52 Pac. 
168, 17 Am. Jur. 968. Nor do we know of authority 
which holds that one may not acquire a ~ight to an ease-
ment to convey high water across anothers land as well 
as low water. The further observation may be made that 
under the doctrine announced by this court in the case 
of East River Bottom v. Boyce, 102 Utah 149, 128 Pac. 
(2d) 277, the execution of the Articles of Incorporation 
did not convey to the corporation any easement over the 
lands of the incorporators. 
It is further argued that the ditches which lead 
from the Duck Creek Dam to plaintiff's lands are drain 
ditches. So far as appears there was no need of con-
structing ditches to drain the water from Duck Creek. 
Moreover drain ditches are constructed in the low places 
of the land to be drained. The ditches leading to and 
across the land of the plaintiff are on the high parts of 
the land as the trial court must have observed when 
viewing the premises. 
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THE WATERS THAT ARE EMPTIED INTO DUCK 
CREEK FROM THE BENJAMIN DRAINAGE DISTRICT ARE 
IN PART 'VATERS THAT FORMERLY FOUND THEIR 
WAY INTO THE LANDS BEING PURCHASED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
There is evidence in this case which tends to show 
that the construction of the Benjamin Drainage system 
intercepted the underground water that found its way 
into the land of plaintiff and thus increased the need 
for more water to irrigate such lands, and that the water 
so intercepted was emptied int.o Duck Creek and thereby 
increasing the flow thereof. 
There does not appear to have been a case in Utah 
where the question has been raised as to whether or not 
the owner of the land which has thus been deprived of 
the water which, prior to the construction of the drain-
age system, found its way to his land has any claim on 
such water when as here it is turned into a natural water 
course from which it may be diverted to the land from 
which it is drained. Colorado has or has had a law 
which provides that water gathered by drainage improve-
ments belongs to the land owners in proportion to the 
amount assessed against each. See Kinney on Irrigation 
and Water Rights, 2nd Ed., Vol. 2, page 3266; see also 
the same volume at page 3265 where meadow lands are 
protected. ~Inch is said in the case of Wrathall v. John-
son et al., 86 Utah 50, 50 Pac. (2d) 755, which in prin-
ciple lends support to a similar view, namely that one 
may not deprive a land owner of his underground water 
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to his damage. Of course, if one's land is drained and 
the water so drained is made available to be again applied 
on the land, no damage would be likely to result. In this 
case the defendant company is seeking to acquire a right 
to the water which is emptied into Duck Creek by the 
Benjarnin Drainage District, some of which doubtless 
served to provide water for the lands of the plaintiff 
prior to the construction of the drainage system. How-
ever, plaintiff need not rely upon such a basis to estab-
lish his water right. Under the evidence in this case, 
the plaintiff has established a right to at least the water 
awarded to him by the court below and we direct the 
attention of the court to the foregoing views to show 
the grave injustice that would be sustained by one simi-
larly situated who could not establish a right by the law 
applicable to the usual method of appropriation. 
So far as appears no one questioned the right of 
the plaintiff's predecessors to use the ditches leading 
frmn the Duck Creek Dam to irrigate the lands of the 
plaintiff until some of the renters of Mr. Stevens failed 
to turn the water out of the ditches leading from that 
dam. Mr. Payne, the secretary of the defendant com-
pany, testified as follows: 
That at times there is more than enough 
water for everyone. 
"Q. It was the ditches that you wanted to be 
careful about, that is right, is it~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. \Yell now, :\[r. Payne, if yon were willing to 
let him (plaintiff) have the use of these 
ditches for $2.00 a year; that was a real 
bargain, wasn't it~ 
~\. \Yell. we had so n1uch trouble with those who 
had been there before flooding the lands, we 
wanted to control and the regulations, which 
in the past two years we had had trouble. 
Q. ~\nd that was what caused all of this fuss, 
you had had some trouble with the two renters 
of :Jir. Stevens f 
A. They weren't the only ones that ran water 
through when the ditches weren't cleaned. 
Q. But that was the cause of this whole con-
troversy, because they had flooded you out 
down there and you were going to keep people 
out of this ditch. 
A. No, we didn't tell him we were going to keep 
him out of the ditch." Tr. 719. 
To the same effect is the testimony of Carl E. Lind-
strom. Tr. 7 42. Needless to say one does not lose an 
easement because he has been guilty of negligence in the 
use thereof. 
The plaintiff has filed a notice of cross appeal and 
a cost bond. We note that under the new rules a cross 
appeal is apparently not necessary. See Rule 74 b. 
In support of the plaintiff's cross appeal, the follow-
ing points or Assignments of Error are relied upon: 
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POINT ONE 
The Trial Court erred in failing to retain juris-
diction of the cause for the purpose of disposing of plain-
tiff's claim for damages on account of the defendant 
unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the use of the water 
and ditches to which he was entitled. 
POINT TWO 
The Trial Court erred in limiting the amount of 
land to which plaintiff is entitled to irrigate through the 
Duck Creek Dam to 68 acres. 
POINT THREE 
The Trial Court erred in awarding to Carl Lind-
strom a right to irrigate 22 acres of land with water to 
be diverted from Duck Creek at the Duck Creek Dam. 
POINT FOUR 
The Trial Court erred in awarding to Lavon Payne 
a right to irrigate 56 acres of land with water to be 
diverted from Duck Creek at the Duck Creek Dam. 
POINT FIVE 
The Trial Court erred in failing to award costs to 
the plain tiff. 
POINT ONE 
It will be seen that by his Complaint the plaintiff 
sought to recover a judgment against the defendant 
company because of damages he sustained because of 
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it refusing and prohibiting the plaintiff from diverting 
any water through ditches leading from the Duck Creek 
Dam to the lands which he was purchasing. R. 6 and 10. 
Dpon that issue, the Court found that the plaintiff was 
unlawfully deprived of the use of water from Duck Creek 
to be di\erted at the Duck Creek Dam, but that no evi-
dence -was offered to show the damages, if any, that 
he had sustained. R. 200. 
It is true that no endence was offered tending to 
show the damages that were sustained. Obviously any 
attempt to show damages until it was determined what 
water the plaintiff was entitled to would have been a 
useless undertaking. While the record is silent touching 
the reason for the failure of plaintiff to offer evidence 
as to damages, it is probably proper to refer to the fact 
that counsel for the plaintiff mentioned to the court the 
fact that it was :first necessary to have determined the 
question of the amount, if any, of water that plaintiff 
was entitled to receive. \Yithout such determination, 
it would be utterly impossible to establish the amount 
of damages. 
As to. the question of damages, either party was 
entitled to a jury. Suppose in this case a jury had been 
demanded and impaneled to pass on the matter of dam-
ages. Such a jury would have been compelled to wait 
more than four years before the question of damages 
could be submitted to them. It is for that reason that 
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eonrts are required to dispose of the equitable issues 
before the legal question can be disposed of. Park v. 
Wilkin.'wn et al., 21 Utah 279, 60 Pac. 945. 
POINT TWO 
The evidence shows that the plaintiff is entitled 
to an award of water to irrigate at least 100 acres of 
land out of the Duck Creek Dam. We have heretofore 
directed the attention of the court to the evidence show-
ing that a number of ditches extended from the Duck 
Creek Dam to various parts of the lands of the plaintiff, 
and that such ditches were in existence at and before 
1906. Also both Mr. Edward R. Stevens and his son, 
Howard Stevens, testified at length as to the amount 
of land that was irrigated with water diverted from the· 
Duck Creek Dam. We shall not again go over such 
testimony, suffice it to observe that the amount of land 
irrigated from that source was at least 100 acres. Tr. 
27,28,51,54,58,73,213,214. 
POINTS THREE AND FOUR 
Points three and four involve the same question of 
law. It will be seen from the findings that the defendant, 
Lavon Payne, has acquired land from Eliza Stewart and 
has, when water has been available, used water from 
the Benjamin Slough to irrigate 56 acres of land owned 
by him. The court also found that for more than 20 
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years the defendant, Carl Lindstrom, has beneficially 
used water from the Benjmnin Slough ~o irrigate 22 
acres of land. R. 19-!. 
There is no evidence and no cla.im is made that either 
:Jir. Payne or :Jir. Lindstrom ever filed on any of the 
waters of Duck Creek or that they or either of them 
ever acquired a right to the use of the water awarded 
to them prior to 1903. 
Counsel for the defendant corporation is also coun-
sel for both Payne and Lindstrom. He has argued at 
considerable length that a water right cannot be acquired 
without a filing in the office of the State Engineer since 
1903. It will be interesting for counsel to inform the 
court why his argument about the law touching the neces-
sity of making a filing in the office of the State Engineer 
since 1903 in order to establish a water right does not 
apply to his clients, Payne and Lindstrom. 
POINT FIVE 
We are mindful that under the law as it existed 
when this action was brought it gave to the trial court 
a discretion in an equity case to fix the costs. However, 
it is well established that when there is a clear abuse of 
discretion, an appellant court will review and reverse 
the action of the trial court. In this case no claim was 
made that the defendant company would sustain any 
injury whatsoever if plaintiff received some water to 
irrigate his land. According to the evidence, defendant 
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company claims to have water to sell. There was also 
capacity in the ditches leading from the Duck Creek 
Dam which plaintiff could use by the payment of $2.00. 
We submit that the judgment should be amended 
to the effect that plaintiff be awarded the right to course 
water through the ditches leading from the Duck Creek 
Dam; that the court below should be directed to permit 
the cause to be tried as to damages, if any, that plaintiff 
has sustained; that the award of a water right to Payne 
and Lindstrom should be reversed and their claim of 
a water right be denied and that plaintiff be awarded 
a right to irrigate 100 acres of land with water diverted 
at the Duck Creek Dam and his costs incurred in the 
trial of this cause in the court below and his costs in this 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELIAS. HANSEN, 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Angus Bishop. 
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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